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Jan. 1955] GELHAUS v. NEVADA IRRIGATION DisT. 
[43 C.2d 779; 278 P.2d 689] 
amended to state a cause of action. The trial court 
defendants' view and repeatedly stated that the 
could not be so amended. Faced with this attitude 
apparently were convinced, and were in 
that a formal offer to amend would have been futile. 
779 
Plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their to 
meet, if possible, the deficiencies in their 
noted. 
The judgment is with directions to the trial court 
to permit plaintiffs to amend their 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, Carter, 
,J., and Schauer, ,J., concurred. 
[Sac. No. 6473. In Bank. ,Jan. 1955.] 
M. F. GELHAUS et aL, Plaintiffs; A. F. GELHAUS et al., 
Appellants, v. NEVADA IRRIGATION DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
[1] Waters- Public Utilities Selling Water- Duty to Furnish 
Water.-A water company is not liable for damages resulting 
from failure to supply water for particular use in absence of 
specific undertaking to supply water for that use. 
[2] Id.- Irrigation Districts- Liability for Failure to Supply 
Water.-An irrigation district serving a mountainous county 
through open canals and ditches may reasonably provide in its 
contract with owner of fish hatchery that such owner acquires 
no right to use water for other than irrigation purposes, and 
it cannot be held liable for damages occasioned solely by in-
adequacy of its service to satisfy other purposes, such as 
providing continuous supply of water to fish hatchery. 
[3] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Contracts.-Contract by irrigation 
district with owner of fish hatchery to furnish continuous 
supply of water through hatchery to be used by owner's son 
for irrigation of 20 acres of crop may not be reasonably con-
strued as including water for use in hatchery, and fact that 
district knew that such owner and other subscribers under 
similar contracts used its water for raising fish or wanted water 
primarily for that purpose is not evidence that, by contract-
ing to supply w·ater for irrigation, it assumed obligation to 
provide service adequate for hatchery. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Waters, §§ 631, 640. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Waters, § 640; [2, 't, 5] Waters, 
§ 551; [3] Waters, § 529. 
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[ 4] Id.- Irrigation Districts- Liability for Failure to Supply 
Water.--By contracting with owner of fish hatchery to supply 
continuous flow of water through hatchery for irrigation pur~ 
poses, irrigation district assumed only those risks that would 
ordinarily result from temporary interruptions in supply of 
water for irrigation, especially where owner of hatchery main~ 
tained reservoir to be used to supply hatchery in case of any 
interruption in supply of water from district; and fact that 
district on past occasions responded to owner's calls 
ing service on those occasions did not indicate any on 
its part of obligation to supply water for hatchery purposes. 
[5] Id.- Irrigation Districts- Liability for Failure to Supply 
Water.-Irrigation district's conduct after executing contract 
with owner of fish hatchery to furnish continuous supply of 
water through hatchery for irrigation purposes does not estop 
district from relying on stated purpose of its service a~ 
limitation on liability it assumed, where district at no time 
l<'d owner of hatchery to believe that he could rely on its 
service for supply of his hatchery, and where most he could 
expect on basis of past experience was that service would 
be restored a few hours after complaint was made. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Nevada 
County. Arthur Coats, Judge.* Affirmed. 
Action against irrigation district for damages for breach 
of contract to supply water. Judgment for defendant not-
withstanding verdict for plaintiff, affirmed. 
Floyd H. Bowers and Thomas F. Sargent for Appellants. 
Minasian & Minasian, P. J. Minasian, James K. Aber-
crombie, Vernon F. Gant, Ronald Harris, Harry Horton and 
Rutherford, Jacobs, Cavalero & Dietrich for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs A. F. Gelhaus and Elvera H. 
Gelhaus appeal from a judgment entered after the granting 
of defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict in an action brought to recover damages for breach 
of a contract to supply water. Stated most favorably to 
plaintiffs, the facts are as follows: In May, 1950, defendant 
irrigation district's ditch tender Huber took the application 
of A. F'. Gelhaus, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, for 10 
miner's inehes continuous flow of water, knowing that plain~ 
tiff' would run it through his fish hatchery located on land 
owned by him. It was understood that after the water was 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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it would be used by plaintiff's son 
acres pasture land farmed by the latter. 
a written application for water prepared on 
a form by defendant. 'rhe application was also 
signed by Huber and approved by defendant's main office. 
It that "The Applicant requests you to supply 
water for In·igation purposes .... Continuous flow of 10 
miner's inches .... To be used on the property owned by 
A. F. Gelhatts . . . . Acres irrigated : Orchard ........ , 
Garden ....... , Pasture 20 ...... , Crop Acreages 20 ...... . 
Service of water to be in accordance with conditions printed 
on the back of this application .... " (The italicized parts 
were written in on the printed form.) Although plaintiff's 
son signed the application in the place provided for the ap-
plicant's signature, plaintiff also signed it in the blank fol-
lowing the words ''Collect from'' with the understanding 
that he was to be a party to the contract. It was provided 
on the back of the application that it was made "under and 
subject to the By-Laws, Rules and Regulations, and rates of 
tolls and charges adopted or to be adopted by the Board of 
Directors'' of defendant, and a copy of the rules and regula-
tions was given to plaintiff. On the morning of September 
4, 1950, plaintiff discovered that the fish in his hatchery 
were dead or dying owing to a water failure. No water was 
running from defendant's ditch into plaintiff's ditch, and 
plaintiff's reservoir, which could hold a two-day supply of 
water, was empty. Although at the trial defendant introduced 
evidence that there was no water shortage on September 4th 
and that an adequate supply was being delivered to the ditch 
that supplied plaintiff, plaintiff and another witness testified 
that defendant's superintendent told them the day after the 
fish were lost that the water had been shut off. On the basis 
of the foregoing facts the jury returned a verdict in favor 
of plaintiffs for $9,416, the value of the fish lost. 
Defendant contends that the trial court properly granted 
its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the 
ground that the written contract precludes imposing liability 
for the loss of fish. It relies primarily on rule 15 of its 
rules and regulations, which provides that "No purchaser of 
any water from the District acquires any proprietary right 
therein by reason of such use, nor does such purchaser acquire 
any right to re-sell such water, or to use it for a purpose 
other than that for which it was applied, nor to use it on 
NEVADA IRRIGATION DIST. C.2d 
other than as stated at the time of making applica-
I t has been held in this state that a water com-
liable for resulting from a failure to 
water for a particular use in the absence of a specific 
to water for that use. (Hunt Bros. Co. 
v. San Lorenzo etc. 150 Cal. 59 P. 1093, 7 L.R.A. 
Niehatts Bros. v. Contra Costa Water Co., 159 Cal. 
P. 375, 36 L.R.A.N.S. 1045] ; see San Leandro 
v. Ra1:lroacl 183 CaL 229, 233 P. 1] .) It would 
appear that one purpose of rule 15 was to insure the applica-
bility of the foregoing holdings and thus limit the risks as-
sumed by defendant to those flowing from a failure to supply 
water for the purpose stated in the application. [2] More-
over, it was entirely reasonable for defendant to limit its 
undertaking. Defendant is an irrigation district serving a 
mountainous county. Most of its water is supplied through 
open canals and ditches. Thus the water supplied to plain-
tiff had to flow through 50 miles of mountain ditches 
and flumes before it reached the Sontag ditch from which 
plaintiff was supplied. The Sontag ditch itself ·was 2% miles 
long, and plaintiff's outlet was the last of 14 on that ditch. 
Defendant's experience demonstrated that it was impossible 
to prevent interruptions in service at the end of such a ditch 
system with the personnel available to it. Despite these dif-
ficulties, however, defendant was in a position to supply 
adequate service for irrigation purposes. Temporary inter-
ruptions in such service would ordinarily be harmless and 
the shortages so caused could be made up by supplying addi-
tional water after service was restored. A fish hatchery, on 
the other hand, requires a constant flow of water to supply 
oxygen to the fish, and an undertaking to supply water ade-
quate for hatchery purposes would involve duties defendant 
was not in a position to discharge. Accordingly, by providing 
in its contract that plaintiff acquired no right to use the water 
for other than irrigation purposes, defendant made clear that 
it was under no duty to supply water for other purposes, and 
it cannot therefore be held liable for damages occasioned 
solely by the inadequacy of its service to satisfy such pur-
poses. 
[3] Plaintiff contends, however, that use of the water 
for a fish hatchery was not excluded by the terms of the 
contract but was included within the meaning of the pro-
vision for the irrigation of 20 acres of crop. He points out 
that in the fish raising business it is common to refer to fish 
Jan. GELHAUS NEVADA IRRIGATION DIST. 783 
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as a crop and to measure so many 
fish or of fish per acre. He also relies on the extrinsic 
evidence that Huber knew he wanted the water for his 
hatchery; that other water users hatcheries with 
water supplied by defendant under the same contract pro-
vision; and that on 16 occasions defendant restored service 
after interruptions at his request knowing that he was 
in immediate need of water for his \Vhen the pro-
vision for the irrigation of 20 acres of crop is considered in 
the light of all of the 
it is not reasonably susceptible of the interpretation contended 
for by plaintiff, and the extinsic evidence relied upon by him 
does not support his position. 
The stated purpose for which the water was applied aptly 
described the use to be made of it by plaintiff's son, who 
signed the contract as applicant. Plaintiff's son had leased 
20 acres of pasture from plaintiff on which he raised clover, 
and he used the water supplied by defendant to irrigate this 
land. There is no suggestion in the language of the contract 
that another unspecified purpose was included within its 
terms, and there was no evidence that plaintiff understood 
the provision for water for irrigation of 20 acres of crop 
to mean water for his hatchery. The surface area of the 
water in the hatchery was not more than a fraction of an 
acre, and plaintiff testified that he did not use the water for 
irrigation thus indicating that he did not understand that 
word in the sense for which he now contends. Moreover, the 
only purpose for which plaintiff wanted the water was to run 
it through his hatchery, and it is hardly conceivable that 
bad he intended to have the right to do so secured by the 
terms of his written contract, he would have left it to be 
inferred from the provision that on its face deals only with 
his son's needs. 
The fact that defendant knew that plaintiff and other sub-
scribers under similar contracts used its water for raising 
fish or wanted it primarily for that purpose is not evidence 
that by contracting to supply water for irrigation it assumed 
the obligation to provide service adequate for a hatchery. 
The operation of a fish hatchery requires a constant flow of 
water to supply the fish with adequate oxygen. Irrigation 
needs, on the other hand, may be met with much less regular 
service, and shortages may be made up by additional ser-
vice after temporary stoppages. [4] By contracting to 
supply a continuous flow for irrigation purposes defendant 
784 GELHAUS v. NEVADA IRRIGATION DIST. [43 C.2d 
assumed only those risks of damages that would ordinarily 
result from temporary interruptions in the supply of water 
for irrigation. On the other hand, it was of no concern to 
defendant that its subscribers might run its water through 
their hatcheries so long as defendant was not required to 
provide service adequate for that use. Moreover, the record 
makes clear that defendant did not at any time render ade-
quate service to plaintiff for the supply of his hatchery and 
that in the past plaintiff had governed his operations accord-
ingly. He maintained a reservoir with a two-day capacity, 
which he checked daily, and on three-hours notice he could 
arrange to supply his hatchery with water from another 
source. It does not appear from the record why these pre-
cautionary measures failed to prevent plaintiff's loss in this 
case. Another of defendant's subscribers testified that he 
had storage capacity for a week's supply of water because 
he knew of the difficulties defendant had in supplying water. 
On 16 occasions before the water failure of September 
4th plaintiff had to notify defendant of a water short-
age and on one of these occasions he lost some of his fish. 
Since defendant was obligated to supply water for irriga-
tion purposes, however, the fact that it responded to plain-
tiff's calls by restoring service on these occasions does not 
indicate any admission on its part of an obligation to supply 
water for hatchery purposes. 
[5] There is likewise no merit in plaintiff's contention 
that defendant's conduct after the contract was executed 
estops it from relying on the stated purpose of its service 
as a limitation upon the liability it assumed. Thus, as stated 
above, defendant at no time led plaintiff to believe that he 
could rely on its service for the supply of his hatchery, and 
the most that he could expect on the basis of past experience 
was that service would be restored a few hours after com-
plaint was made. Plaintiff testified, however, that by the 
time he discovered the water failure of September 4th. it was 
too late to save his fish within the time ordinarily required 
to restore service. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion does not give proper effect to the 
extrinsic evidence which the jury found adequate in con-
,Jan. 19551 EsTATE OF QUINN 
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struing the contract as requiring that water be supplied for 
a fish hatchery. 
\Vhen this case was before the District Court of 
Third Appellate District, Mr. Justice Schottky of that court 
prepared a very able and learned opinion which adequately 
disposes of all of the issues in tl1is case, which was 
eoncurred in by Presiding Justice Van and Mr. Justice 
Peek of that court. The District Court of in said 
opinion held that the trial court erred in granting respondent's 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It reversed 
the judgment with directions to the trial court to enter judg. 
ment on the verdict. The opinion of the District Court of 
Appeal is reported in 265 P.2d at page 530. I am in full 
accord with the views expressed by the District Court of 
Appeal in said opinion and I adopt the same as my dissent. 
Shenk, J., concurred. 
[S. 1<'. Xo. 18964. In Bank. Jan. 14, 1955.) 
Estate of ETHEL C. QUINN, Deceased. EDMUND G 
BRO\VN, as Attorney General, etc., Appellant, v. PRES· 
TON HATCH, as Guardian, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Decedents' Estates-Jurisdiction.~-Probate proceedings being 
purely statutory and therefore special in nature, superior 
court, although court of general jurisdiction, is circumscribed 
in this class of proceedings by provisions of statute conferring 
such jurisdiction, and may not competently proceed in manner 
essentially different from that provided. 
[2] !d.-Heirship Proceedings-Parties.-Attorney general seeking 
to enforce charitable trust created by a will which names 
neither specifie eharity nor trustf•e is not authorized to initiate 
;m heirship proceeding, hP not being "executor or adminis· 
ti·ator" nor one "claiming· to be an heir ... or entitled to 
distribution," within Prob. Code, ~ 1080, though he may, in 
<'vent one of authorized persons should file initial heirship peti-
tion, properly appear and urge his claim, or he may, in event 
distribution should be sought, intervene and seek adjudication 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Courts, § 10; Executors and Administrators, 
~ 19 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Fjstates, ~ 3G; De-
f:edents' Estates, § 986.1. 
